The Labor Market for Directors and Externalities in Corporate Governance afa.journalArticleDetail – American Finance Association

A new study by Doron Levit and Nadya Malekno finds:

directors’ desire to be invited to other boards creates strategic complementarity of corporate governance across firms. Directors’ reputational concerns amplify the governance system: strong systems become stronger and weak systems become weaker.

via The Labor Market for Directors and Externalities in Corporate Governance afa.journalArticleDetail – American Finance Association.

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