Should the investment arm of one sovereign nation be using its financial muscle to influence salary policies in other sovereign nations, setting principles which then guide how it votes in particular examples?
It isn’t surprising that he gets the wrong answer, calling the sovereign wealth fund’s votes against excessive compensation “mission creep.” He’s asking the wrong question. It should be: “Should a major shareholders who is a sophisticated institutional investor have the right to exercise its independent judgement on matters legally required to be put to a shareholder vote?”
The answer is yes. That is what capitalism means. A provider of capital has certain rights granted to ensure confidence in the markets through transparency, accountability, and structural limits on conflicts of interest. To put it another way, who is in a better position to evaluate CEO pay, the board members selected by, paid by, and informed by the CEO him or herself or a fiduciary shareholder obligated to deploy its resources to maximize returns for its beneficial owners?
Gilbert presents no evidence that these actions are taken for any reason other than the creation of shareholder value, a case he cannot make for the design of most CEO pay plans. On the contrary, he quotes the fund’s policy approvingly, noting that
it would back remuneration policies that are “driven by long-term value creation and aligns CEO and shareholder interests.” Pay packages should be transparent, pension entitlements should be only “a minor part” of total packages, while a “substantial proportion” should be in the form of equity that’s locked in for “at least five and preferably 10 years.”
His objection is Norges’ conclusion that its efforts should “moderate pay levels in the longer term.” Of course, he has no basis for arguing that this goal, even if achieved, would be anything other than beneficial to shareholders.