Highlights of the new DOL/EBSA Rule on ESG

Emphasis added. Full text of the rule.

  • Like the NPRM, the final rule amends the current regulation to delete the “pecuniary/non-pecuniary” terminology based on concerns that the terminology causes confusion and a chilling effect to financially beneficial choices.
  • Like the NPRM, the final rule amends the current regulation to make it clear that a fiduciary’s determination with respect to an investment or investment course of action must be based on factors that the fiduciary reasonably determines are relevant to a risk and return analysis and that such factors may include the economic effects of climate change and other environmental, social, or governance factors on the particular investment or investment course of action.
  • Like the NPRM, the final rule amends the current regulation to remove the stricter rules for QDIAs, such that, under the final rule, the same standards apply to QDIAs as to investments generally.
  • Like the NPRM, the final rule amends the current regulation’s “tiebreaker” test, which permits fiduciaries to consider collateral benefits as tiebreakers in some circumstances. The current regulation imposes a requirement that competing investments be indistinguishable based on pecuniary factors alone before fiduciaries can turn to collateral factors to break a tie and imposes a special documentation requirement on the use of such factors. The final rule replaces those provisions with a standard that instead requires the fiduciary to conclude prudently that competing investments, or competing investment courses of action, equally serve the financial interests of the plan over the appropriate time horizon. In such cases, the fiduciary is not prohibited from selecting the investment, or investment course of action, based on collateral benefits other than investment returns. The final rule also removes the current regulation’s special regulatory documentation requirements in favor of ERISA’s generally applicable statutory duty to prudently document plan affairs.
  • The final rule adds a new provision clarifying that fiduciaries do not violate their duty of loyalty solely because they take participants’ preferences into account when constructing a menu of prudent investment options for participant-directed individual account plans. If accommodating participants’ preferences will lead to greater participation and higher deferral rates, as suggested by commenters, then it could lead to greater retirement security. Thus, in this way, giving consideration to whether an investment option aligns with participants’ preferences can be relevant to furthering the purposes of the plan.
  • Like the NPRM, the final rule amends the current regulation to eliminate the statement in paragraph (e)(2)(ii) of the current regulation that “the fiduciary duty to manage shareholder rights appurtenant to shares of stock does not require the voting of every proxy or the exercise of every shareholder right.” The final rule eliminates this provision because it may be misread as suggesting that plan fiduciaries should be indifferent to the exercise of their rights as shareholders, even if the cost is minimal.
  • Like the NPRM, the final rule amends the current regulation to remove the two “safe harbor” examples for proxy voting policies permissible under paragraphs (e)(3)(i)(A) and (B) of the current regulation. One of these safe harbors permitted a policy to limit voting resources to types of proposals that the fiduciary has prudently determined are substantially related to the issuer’s business activities or are expected to have a material effect on the value of the investment. The other safe harbor permitted a policy of refraining from voting on proposals or types of proposals when the plan’s holding in a single issuer relative to the plan’s total investment assets is below a quantitative threshold. Taken together, the Department believes the safe harbors encouraged abstention as the normal course and the Department does not support that position because it fails to recognize the importance that prudent management of shareholder rights can have in enhancing the value of plan assets or protecting plan assets from risk. Because of this failure, the Department believes these safe harbors do not adequately safeguard the interests of plans and their participants and beneficiaries.
  • Like the NPRM, the final rule eliminates paragraph (e)(2)(iii) of the current regulation, which sets out specific monitoring obligations with respect to use of investment managers or proxy voting firms. The final rule instead addresses such monitoring obligations in another provision of the regulation that more generally covers selection and monitoring obligations. These amendments address concerns that the specific monitoring provision could be read as requiring special obligations above and beyond the statutory obligations of prudence and loyalty that generally apply to monitoring the work of service providers.
  • Like the NPRM, the final rule amends the current regulation to eliminate from paragraph (e)(2)(ii)(E) of the current regulation a specific requirement on maintaining records on proxy voting activities and other exercises of shareholder rights. The provision is removed from the current regulation because it is widely perceived as treating proxy voting and other exercises of shareholder rights differently from other fiduciary activities and, in that respect, risks creating a misperception that proxy voting and other exercises of shareholder rights are disfavored or carry greater fiduciary obligations than other fiduciary activities.

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